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Abstract
What is the best market-neutral implementation of classical Equity Factors? Should one use
the specific predictability of the short-leg to build a zero beta Long-Short portfolio, in spite of the
specific costs associated to shorting, or is it preferable to ban the shorts and hedge the long-leg with
– say – an index future? We revisit this question by focusing on the relative predictability of the
two legs, the issue of diversification, and various sources of costs. Our conclusion is that, using the
same Factors, a Long-Short implementation leads to superior risk-adjusted returns than its Hedged
Long-Only counterpart, at least when Assets Under Management are not too large.
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1 Introduction
Equity Factor investing has become increasingly popular over the past decade. Practitioners and aca-
demics realized in the 70’s that the single factor, CAPM model [17] has its own limitations and had
to be generalized in order to account for more than one risk driver [16]. Several questions remain
open regarding the nature of these extra factors: are they pure risk premia [1, 8, 20, 21], genuine mar-
ket anomalies [2, 5, 10, 18], or unavoidable consequences of institutional constrained investors [9]?
How many such factors must be considered: 3, as in the original Fama-French model [11], or several
hundreds as advocated in the so-called factor-zoo literature [12, 13]?.
There is also a wide variety of ways these factors can be converted into predictive signals and
realistic portfolios. The primary criterion concerns the market exposure of the portfolio: are we looking
for a market-neutral implementation of these factors, with the long and short legs of the portfolio
offsetting its overall beta exposure, or are we concerned with so-called smart-beta strategies, where
the portfolio has a positive beta exposure to the equity market, but is tilted in the direction of said
factors?
Both approaches make sense, of course, and correspond to different asset management mandates
and different investor profiles. Still, for any given portfolio we can always identify and isolate the
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portfolio‘s exposure to the equity index and analyse the performance of its market neutral, active com-
ponent. As an example, in the smart-beta style of implementations, this market neutral component can
be represented by a portfolio with long-only equity positions, hedged by a short equity index futures.
This is in fact a realistic, cost-aware set-up, which allows one to build a market-neutral factor strategy.
An alternative is the classical Long-Short equity portfolio, with an explicit short position on some
stocks. The question that we are going to address in this paper is whether any of these two implemen-
tations yields significantly better results for the active, market-neutral risk component of the portfolio,
in particular when realistic transaction costs are accounted for. Or, stated differently: Are explicit short
positions beneficial or detrimental to equity factor strategies?
Not surprisingly, we will see that the predictability power of the short signals plays a crucial role in
determining which of the two implementations should be preferred. We will also show that a proper
answer to this question depends quite heavily on some details related to the factor under scrutiny,
on the portfolio construction algorithm, and on the very definition of the equity market. We will pay
special attention to implementation costs, including both trading costs (impact) and financing costs,
the latter substantially affecting the profitability of the short leg.
This problem has been addressed in the literature many times in the past. Some authors focus
on the difficulties related to actually taking short positions [3], while others find that under some
well defined market conditions the short leg of equity strategies is more profitable [19]. There seems
to be a general agreement that Long-Short strategies are more profitable than constrained long-only
ones [15], despite some claims that the extra-benefit is marginal and that it would disappear when
costs are properly accounted for [14].
More recently, the authors of [4] have posted a study which suggests that an optimal implementa-
tion of market-neutral equity factors should not contain explicit short positions at all. Not only long
signals seem to be of better quality than short signals, but also long positions provide a more diversified
exposure to different factors than the shorts.
The contribution of the present study to the debate consists in proposing a realistic, cost-aware
framework allowing to compare a Long-Short equity portfolio to a beta-Hedged Long-Only one. In
our view, there are often two missing ingredients in the previous research works that should carefully
be taken into account. One is the risk management and the portfolio construction, that is a proper
control of the portfolio exposure to the desired descriptor under risk-related constraints – which could
be constant volatility and/or maximum leverage for instance. This step is particularly crucial when
considering long-only portfolios, as we will show in Section 4. The other key point is costs. Allowing
for short positions implies leverage and borrowing costs that we will consider explicitly when building
the portfolio.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a simple toy model which allows
one to rationalize when the use of shorts can bring value to a portfolio. When confronted to real
predictability data, our criterion suggests that shorts are indeed accretive. In Section 3 we revisit the
recent paper of the Robeco group [4]. While we reproduce the results of that study, we find that their
conclusion that one should “drop the shorts” has to be tempered. As we show in Section 4, a cost-aware
portfolio construction using the full range of factor predictors leads to a clear over-performance of a
Long-Short implementation compared to a beta-hedged long only portfolio.
2 Building Intuition: Insights From A Toy Model
Consider an investment universe with two assets (Asset 1 and Asset 2) and the Market, with respective
returns modeled by some random variables R1, R2 and M . We suppose that the returns of Asset 1 and
Asset 2 have a positive exposure to Market, an exposure to a second factor with returns F , independent
from Market, and some idiosyncratic residuals "1 and "2, so that R1 and R2
R1 = β1M +α1F + "1 with β1 > 0, (1)
R2 = β2M −α2F + "2 with β2 > 0 (2)
(for convenience, we denote the exposure of Asset 2 to F by −α2 rather than α2). Up to a rescaling of
both assets, one can suppose with loss of generality that β1 = β2 = 1. Then, up to a further rescaling
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Figure 1: Illustration of (5) when κ= Var("2)/Var("1) = 1, for various values of γ= Var("1)/Var(F). When the variance of F
dominates that of the residues "i , (blue curve), the ratio of Sharpe ratios stays close to 1 even for large values of α2, because
in this case, both portfolios are approximately equivalent up to a global rescaling.
of F , one can set α1 = 1, so that the above equations rewrites
R1 = M + F + "1 (3)
R2 = M −α2F + "2 . (4)
We shall also assume that:
• E(F)> 0 (factor F has positive performance on average),
• F,"1,"2 are independent and E("i) = 0 for i = 1, 2 (residual returns have no alpha).
We want to build a portfolio betting on F (hence on Asset 1) in a market-neutral way, i.e. with no
global exposure to M . Up to a global rescaling of the positions, the two possibilities we have at hand
are a Long-Short (LS) portfolio and a long position that we beta-hedge (LH), that is:
piLS ≡ {1,−1, 0}
piLH = {1, 0,−1}
where pi =(respective weights of Asset 1, Asset 2 and Market). The following result compares the
Sharpe Ratios of these portfolios and determines, depending on the parameters α2, γ≡ Var("1)/Var(F)
and κ≡ Var("2)/Var("1), which one should be preferred.
We find (see Appendix. A for details) the following results:
SR(piLS)
SR(piLH)
=
√√√ 1+ γ
1+ γ(1+κ)(1+α2)2
(5)
which implies that
SR(piLS)> SR(piLH) ⇐⇒ α2 >p1+κ− 1. (6)
This simple result elicits a transition between two regimes. If the hedging asset (Asset 2 here) under-
performs the Market enough, then from a (no-costs) Sharpe Ratio perspective the long–short market-
neutral portfolio on Assets 1 and 2 outperforms the beta-hedged long portfolio on Asset 1. This is in
line with the intuition that, if we have enough predictability on the short part of our portfolio, then
shorts should be included.
Our simple model suggests a quantitative threshold on the predictability of the short vs. the long
positions beyond which a Long-Short implementation is beneficial. This threshold can be used on real
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Figure 2: The predictability power of the Momentum Factor (UMD, as defined in Appendix B, on the European stock pool,
1985-2020). For every day and every stock in the pool, we put on the X-axis the value of the descriptor properly normalized,
and on the Y-axis the future residual return of the corresponding stock (i.e. the total stock return minus its beta component on
the largest principal component of the covariance matrix). All these points are then averaged inside bins (the standard errors
for these averages are also represented). The plain line is a linear regression through the points with a positive predictor.
The dashed line shows the 40% threshold that short predictors have to beat in order for shorts to be accretive, according to
the model.
Figure 3: Global (USA-Canada, Europe, Japan, Australia, 2000-2020) view of the predictability plot of Fig. 2. We show the
ratio of the slope of the points corresponding to negative values of the predictor to the slope of the points corresponding to
positive values of the predictor, for 5 classical factors defined in Appendix B. The dashed line materializes the 40% threshold
of our toy model.
data as we show in Figs. 2, 3. As the data show for most of the equity factors that we will consider in
this study (see next section), the short side of the predictor turns out to be sufficiently strong to make
short positions profitable, at least in principle. In other words, taking short equity positions is a priori a
better choice than simply shorting the future contract. If the residual returns "i have the same volatility
(κ= 1), then as soon as α2 >
p
2−1 (an under-performance of Asset 2 with respect to Market at least
40% of the out-performance of Asset 1), we find SR(piLS)> SR(piLH). This threshold is materialized by
dashed lines in Figures 1, 2, 3.
Finally, note that since
p
1+κ − 1 is an increasing function of κ, the higher the volatility of the
residual returns of Asset 2, the stronger the under-performance of Asset 2 for SR(piLS) > SR(piLH) to
hold.
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Figure 4: Fama-French portfolios. Left: Sharpe Ratios of hedged long and short legs. Right: mean correlation, across
factors, of long (resp. short) legs with other long (resp. short) legs. These measures result in a portfolio with maximum
Sharpe (based on the 10 synthetic assets defined by the hedged long and short legs of these 5 factors) weighting long (resp.
short) legs at about 70% (resp. 30%).
Figure 5: Fama-French portfolios. Correlation, for each factor, of the difference∆=(longs − βlongsSPmini) − (βshortsSPmini− shorts) with SMB. This correlation can be explained as follows: this difference roughly rewrites as (longs + shorts) − 2
SPmini. Given the Fama-French portfolios used in [4] are 50% small caps and 50% large caps,∆ is correlated to the difference
between and equally-weighted index with a market-cap weighted index, i.e. to SMB.
3 Revisiting The Robeco Paper
In this section we revisit the results advertised in ref. [4]. The study is based on the classical Fama-
French factors, as available in the Kenneth French data library 1. We consider the following factors:
HML (aka Value), WML (aka Momentum), RMW (aka Profitability), CMA (aka Investment), and also
VOL, i.e. a low volatility factor available on line 2. These factors are built using monthly returns of
so-called Fama-French “2x3” portfolios on the US market (see the corresponding websites for more
details). This construction allows one to clearly distinguish a long and a short leg for each factor.
In order to run a fair comparison between long and short legs, one beta-hedges each factor using a
“market index” built using the same 2x3 building blocks. Note that by construction this index contains
50% of small cap. stocks and 50% of large cap. stocks. Each factor is rescaled to get a beta of one with
respect to the index. The index contribution is then removed to get a beta-neutral leg.
The Sharpe ratio of each beta-neutral leg is shown in Fig. 4-Left. Overall, there is no striking
difference of Sharpe ratio between the long and short legs, except perhaps for VOL. However, Fig. 4-
Right reveals that the returns of the different short legs are significantly more correlated than that
of the long legs, as pointed out in [4]. Hence, an optimal allocation will be more tilted towards the
long portfolios although, at variance with [4], we find that the short leg should be allocated 30% of
the weight, and not zero weight. The discrepancy between our conclusions maybe related to subtle
implementation differences that we have not been able to identify. At the very least, this means that
the “no-short” recommendation is not robust against minor changes.
More importantly, the very definition of the market index – which serves as a hedge – is found to
matter quite dramatically. Using for example the SPmini index (which is easily implementable as a
low-cost hedge), we now find that the Sharpe ratio of the long legs is significantly better that that of
1https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
2https://www.robeco.com/en/themes/datasets/
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Figure 6: Left: Sharpe Ratios of the LH and LS implementations of the different factors. Right: Mean correlation of each
factor with the other factors in the LH and LS implementations.
the short legs, as reported in [4]. However, this is because the difference between the two legs is now
mechanically exposed to the SMB factor: see Fig. 5.
We now turn to the analysis of a realistic implementation of factor trading, including the important
issue of costs, in both its Long-Short (LS) and Hedged Long-Only (LH) incarnations. We will see that
our main conclusion, namely that factor trading through Long-Short portfolios over-performs Hedged
Long-Only portfolios.
4 A Realistic Implementation Framework
We define a set of predictors based on ranked metrics (Low Volatility, Momentum, Returns Over Assets,
Small Minus Big, Value Earnings, see Appendix B) which, we believe, represent well the equity factor
space, on a pool of stocks distributed over the main exchanges (USA-Canada, Europe, Asia, Australia),
proportionally to the available liquidity. We prefer ranked implementations over 2x3 implementations
since, as shown for example in Fig. 2, there is predictability even within the “central” quantiles, not
only the extremes one. Our study spans the period 2000-2020.
We then slow down the corresponding signals (via an Exponential Moving Average of 150 days), so
that the turnover of the portfolios reach reasonable values, compatible with typical trading costs. More
precisely, the turnover is ≈ 0.5% of AUMs per day for the LH portfolio and ≈ 2% of the Gross Market
Value for the LS portfolio.
The LH portfolio is implemented via a long-only constrained optimization problem where the portfo-
lio’s overlap with the factor predictor (or of the aggregated factors) is maximized, at controlled turnover
cost. More precisely, the portfolio is updated daily as the solution of the daily optimization problem
portfoliot = Argmax
 〈portfoliot · factors predictort〉 − trading costs
under global AUM constraints plus individual risk constraints (i.e. a maximum position on each single
stock). The trading costs are the sum, for each trade, of a linear term accounting for bid-ask spread
and broker costs, plus a term accounting for market impact that depends on the corresponding stock’s
liquidity. These trading costs are computed using our best in-house estimates of all these separate
contributions, in particular of the square-root impact law documented in, e.g. [6] and refs. therein.
We then look at the tracking error of the long-only portfolio with respect to easily tradeable market
indexes (respectively: S&P 500, DJ EURO STOXX 50, TOPIX, S&P ASX 200 and S&P/TSX 60 Total
Return indices). This tracking error corresponds to our LH implementation. The LS portfolio is con-
structed using the same signals and the same cost control, plus a volatility target equal to that of LH.
This construction requires a certain leverage ratio that leads to some extra financing costs, together
with some idiosyncratic shorting costs for hard-to-borrow stocks, which we carefully account for3.
The results of these experiments, using either single factors or the aggregate of different factors,
are summarized below and illustrated in Figs. 6, 7 and 8. We fix the size of the AUMs to 1 Billion USD.
• First, we see that the LH implementation of individual factors leads to Sharpe Ratios that are com-
parable, on average, to those of the LS implementation (see Fig. 6, left). But we now see that the
3We use our in-house data base for hard-to-borrow fees, which corresponds to the fees actually paid by the CFM equity
market neutral programs over the years
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Figure 7: Factors’ weights in maximum Sharpe LH and LS portfolios.
Figure 8: Left: P&L (including all costs) of the LH and LS implementations, both with a realised volatility of 6.4% annual.
Both portfolios take as an input signal the equi-weighted sum of all factors predictors: Low Volatility, Momentum, Returns
Over Assets, Small Minus Big, Value Earnings. The Sharpe ratio of LH/LS are, respectively 0.56 and 0.98. Right: Drawdown
time series (AUM− Peak Value/AUM) for both implementations. The mean depth for LH amounts to -8.2%, but only -3.9%
for LS.
LH implementations of the different factors are way more correlated than their LS counterparts
(see Fig. 6, right).
• Taking the factors’ Sharpe ratios and their correlations into account, we compute the weight
of each factor in the portfolio with maximum Sharpe in both cases (LH and LS). We see, as
expected, that the LS implementation is much more diversified between the different factors (see
Fig. 7). Note that better diversification allows one to expect more robustness of the out-of-sample
performance.
• Finally, the P&Ls of the LH and LS implementations of aggregated factors (with equal weights)
are presented in Fig. 8 (left). The Sharpe ratio of the LS implementation is found to be ≈ 1,
significantly higher than the one of the LH implementation (≈ 0.56). Let us emphasize that all
costs (trading costs, leverage financing costs of LS, and borrowing costs of LS) are included in
these P&L. The breakdown of these costs is detailed in Tab. 1. Note that although total costs are≈
60% higher for the LS implementation, it still significantly over-performs the LH implementation.
Note also that this conclusion may not hold for very large AUMs, given the higher turnover of the
LS implementation and the super-linearity of impact costs as a function of trading volume.
Sharpe mean drawdown returns+div. trad. cost financ. cost short borrow. cost
LH 0.56 -8.2% 8.4% -2.8% -2.0% NA
LS 0.98 -3.9% 14.2% -4.8% -2.6% -0.6%
Table 1: LH vs LS main P&L statistics, with returns and costs in percent per year of the 1 Billion USD AUMs.
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5 Conclusions
The conclusions of our study are quite clear: first, when discussing the relative merits of Hedged Long-
Only and Long-Short portfolios, details matter. One should carefully discuss what “market” is used to
hedge the Long-Only positions, since different definitions can lead to uncontrolled exposures to some
factors, such as Small Minus Big or Low Volatility. All implementation costs should be estimated and
integrated in the final P&L horse-race. Once all this is done, and provided our analysis is error-free, we
unambiguously find that Long-Short implementations best Hedged Long-Only ones, at least when the
AUMs are not too large. This conclusion is bolstered by the analysis of a very simple toy model, which
provides a threshold on the strength of short predictors. Empirical predictability of the shorts indeed
seem to lie beyond that threshold by a substantial margin.
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interesting discussions and suggestions.
A More On The Toy Model
In this appendix, we show how we get equation (5) in Section 2. We have
PNL(piLS) = (1+α2)F + "1 − "2 , (7)
so that
SR(piLS) =
(1+α2)E(F)p
(1+α2)2Var(F) + Var("1) + Var("2)
(8)
Similarly,
SR(piLS) =
E(F)p
Var(F) + Var("1)
(9)
Eq. (5) follows immediately and we deduce that
SR(piLS)> SR(piLH) ⇐⇒ (1+α2)2 > 1+ κ (10)
(11)
⇐⇒ α2 >p1+κ− 1, (12)
where we used the hypothesis that 1+α2 > 0.
B Brief Description Of The Equity Factors
• Momentum: 11 month mean of returns lagged by 1 month ranked
• Value Earnings: earnings/price ranked
• Low Volatility: 250 day volatility ranked
• Size: market cap (lagged by 20 days, averaged over 40 days) ranked
• ROA: net income/total assets ranked
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